Since the advent of cryptographic chips, the side channel attacks have become a serious threat to cryptographic algorithms and security systems. The side channel attacks use weaknesses in the chip implementation instead of using the computational weaknesses of the algor
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Since the advent of cryptographic chips, the side channel attacks have become a serious threat to cryptographic algorithms and security systems. The side channel attacks use weaknesses in the chip implementation instead of using the computational weaknesses of the algorithms. The scan chain that is widely used in the chip test is one of these side channels. To avoid an attack using a scan chain, one can remove the scan chain after the construction test, but this method makes it impossible to test the post-construction and updating the circuit. Therefore, in addition to preserving the testability of the scan chain, it is necessary to look for a method to prevent the side channel attacks. In this article, a method is proposed to identify the attacker and prevent his scan-based attacks. In this way, by the user authorization, the corresponding output will be generated and the attacker's access to sensitive information is prevented. The proposed method, with an area overhead of less than 1%, power overhead around 1% and a negligible delay overhead retains testability and can prevent differential and signature-based scan attacks better than previous state-of-the-art techniques.
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